diff --git a/.gitea/scripts/reconcile-latest.sh b/.gitea/scripts/reconcile-latest.sh
new file mode 100755
index 00000000..5a699277
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.gitea/scripts/reconcile-latest.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Assert that a builder image's :latest is the SAME manifest as its content key, and
+# re-point it when it isn't.
+#
+# This is what we do instead of pinning consumers by @sha256: digest
+# (security-review-2026-08-05, H-6 — see the reasoning at the top of docker.yml). The
+# content key is a hash of the ci/ tree, so "which image should :latest be?" has an
+# answer derivable from the commit alone. Checking it on every run turns :latest from a
+# tag someone remembered to move into a function of the tree.
+#
+# Two different things make them diverge and neither is distinguishable from here:
+#
+#   - Someone overwrote :latest out of band. Post-fix that needs the push credential,
+#     but it is exactly the H-6 attack and it must not pass silently.
+#   - ci/ was reverted. The older key is already a cache hit, so nothing rebuilds and
+#     nothing re-points :latest — it stays on the newer build forever while every
+#     consumer pulls a builder that does not match the tree it is building. That bug
+#     predates this script.
+#
+# Both are repaired identically, so: repair, and shout. Failing the build instead would
+# turn a legitimate revert into a red main with no way forward.
+#
+# Reads go to the anonymous port, the single write to the authenticated one.
+set -euo pipefail
+
+IMAGE="${1:?usage: reconcile-latest.sh <image> <content-key>}"
+KEY="${2:?usage: reconcile-latest.sh <image> <content-key>}"
+: "${CI_REGISTRY:?CI_REGISTRY not set}"
+: "${CI_REGISTRY_PUSH:?CI_REGISTRY_PUSH not set}"
+: "${CI_REGISTRY_PASSWORD:?CI_REGISTRY_PASSWORD not set}"
+
+ACCEPT='Accept: application/vnd.docker.distribution.manifest.v2+json, application/vnd.oci.image.manifest.v1+json, application/vnd.oci.image.index.v1+json, application/vnd.docker.distribution.manifest.list.v2+json'
+
+# Digest of a tag, or empty if the tag does not exist. Never fails the script itself —
+# "missing" is a state this has to reason about, not an error to abort on.
+digest_of() {
+  curl -sfI -H "$ACCEPT" "http://$CI_REGISTRY/v2/$IMAGE/manifests/$1" 2>/dev/null \
+    | tr -d '\r' | sed -n 's/^[Dd]ocker-[Cc]ontent-[Dd]igest: //p' || true
+}
+
+key_digest=$(digest_of "$KEY")
+latest_digest=$(digest_of latest)
+
+if [ -z "$key_digest" ]; then
+  echo "::error::$IMAGE:$KEY has no manifest — the build or push above did not land"
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+if [ "$key_digest" = "$latest_digest" ]; then
+  echo "$IMAGE:latest == :$KEY ($key_digest)"
+  exit 0
+fi
+
+echo "::warning::$IMAGE:latest did not match its content key :$KEY — re-pointing it. If ci/ was not just reverted, someone overwrote this tag out of band: check the registry access log on home-ci-core."
+echo "  was:    ${latest_digest:-<no :latest tag>}"
+echo "  wanted: $key_digest  (:$KEY)"
+
+tmp=$(mktemp)
+trap 'rm -f "$tmp"' EXIT
+media_type=$(curl -sfI -H "$ACCEPT" "http://$CI_REGISTRY/v2/$IMAGE/manifests/$KEY" \
+  | tr -d '\r' | sed -n 's/^[Cc]ontent-[Tt]ype: //p')
+curl -sf -H "$ACCEPT" -o "$tmp" "http://$CI_REGISTRY/v2/$IMAGE/manifests/$KEY"
+curl -sf -u "ci:$CI_REGISTRY_PASSWORD" -X PUT -H "Content-Type: $media_type" \
+  --data-binary @"$tmp" "http://$CI_REGISTRY_PUSH/v2/$IMAGE/manifests/latest"
+
+now=$(digest_of latest)
+[ "$now" = "$key_digest" ] || { echo "::error::re-point failed: :latest is $now"; exit 1; }
+echo "$IMAGE:latest re-pointed to $key_digest"
diff --git a/.gitea/workflows/docker.yml b/.gitea/workflows/docker.yml
index ec3422e8..8cb826d6 100644
--- a/.gitea/workflows/docker.yml
+++ b/.gitea/workflows/docker.yml
@@ -3,13 +3,18 @@
 # Two very different image families now:
 #
 #   BUILDER images (punktfunk-rust-ci{,-noble,-arm64cross}, punktfunk-fedora{,44}-rpm)
-#     live on the LAN registry (home-ci-core, 192.168.1.58:5010 — unom/infra
-#     runners/ci-core/) and are CONTENT-KEYED: the tag is a hash of what they are built
-#     from (the ci/ tree, + rust-toolchain.toml for the cross image), and a build only
-#     happens when that key has no manifest yet. A push that doesn't touch ci/ costs one
-#     curl per image (~seconds), pushes nothing over the WAN, and mints no per-SHA tag
-#     debris on the runners — the failure mode that filled the fleet's disks. `:latest`
-#     is re-pushed alongside every new key and is what the consuming workflows pin.
+#     live on the LAN registry (home-ci-core — unom/infra runners/ci-core/) and are
+#     CONTENT-KEYED: the tag is a hash of what they are built from (the ci/ tree, +
+#     rust-toolchain.toml for the cross image), and a build only happens when that key
+#     has no manifest yet. A push that doesn't touch ci/ costs one curl per image
+#     (~seconds), pushes nothing over the WAN, and mints no per-SHA tag debris on the
+#     runners — the failure mode that filled the fleet's disks. `:latest` is re-pushed
+#     alongside every new key and is what the consuming workflows pin.
+#
+#     READS come from :5010 and need no credential. WRITES go to :5011 and need
+#     CI_REGISTRY_PASSWORD. Same store behind both — a registry keys by repository name,
+#     not by the host:port the client used — so an image pushed to :5011 is the same
+#     image every consumer pulls from :5010.
 #
 #   APP images (punktfunk-web, punktfunk-docs) are deployables: they keep going to the
 #     Gitea registry (git.unom.io) with :latest + :sha-<8> (+ :vX.Y.Z on tags), because
@@ -17,26 +22,38 @@
 #
 # Host and clients are intentionally NOT containerized (see CLAUDE.md "What's left").
 #
-# REGISTRY_TOKEN: repo Actions secret, a PAT with write:package scope (app images only —
-# the LAN registry is unauthenticated inside the LAN).
+# REGISTRY_TOKEN: repo Actions secret, a PAT with write:package scope (app images).
+# CI_REGISTRY_PASSWORD: repo Actions secret, the LAN registry's push credential for user
+# `ci`. Generated on ci-core into /srv/ci/stack/registry-secret; rotate in both places.
 #
-# ⚠ OPEN FINDING — security-review-2026-08-05 H-6. That parenthetical is the whole problem.
-# Every secret-bearing job in this repo runs INSIDE an image pulled from this registry by a
-# MUTABLE tag (`:latest`), and the registry accepts pushes from any LAN peer. Attacker position #1
-# of the project's own threat model — an unauthenticated LAN peer — therefore does not need to
-# break any signing logic: they push one tag, and the next android.yml run executes their code in
-# the same job that does `echo "$RELEASE_KEYSTORE_BASE64" | base64 -d > release.jks`. Same shape
-# for rpm.yml (RPM_GPG_PRIVATE_KEY), android-promote.yml (SERVICE_ACCOUNT_JSON), and every other
-# consumer listed by `grep -l 192.168.1.58:5010 .gitea/workflows/`.
+# --- security-review-2026-08-05 H-6, FIXED 2026-08-05 -------------------------------
+# The registry used to accept anonymous pushes from any LAN peer, and every
+# secret-bearing job in this repo runs INSIDE an image pulled from it. Attacker
+# position #1 of the project's own threat model did not need to break any signing
+# logic: push one tag, and the next android.yml run executes their code in the same job
+# that does `echo "$RELEASE_KEYSTORE_BASE64" | base64 -d > release.jks`. Same shape for
+# rpm.yml (RPM_GPG_PRIVATE_KEY) and android-promote.yml (SERVICE_ACCOUNT_JSON).
 #
-# The fix is two halves and only one of them lives in this repo:
-#   1. INFRA (unom/infra, runners/ci-core/): put auth in front of the registry, or move the
-#      builder images to git.unom.io where pushes are already authenticated.
-#   2. HERE: once pushes are authenticated, pin consumers by `@sha256:` digest rather than
-#      `:latest`, so a compromised push cannot retroactively change what a green run built.
-#      Pinning by tag — including the content-keyed `$KEY` tags below — is NOT sufficient while
-#      the registry is open, because a tag can simply be overwritten.
-# Neither half is done. The content-keying below bounds rebuild churn; it is not a trust boundary.
+# The infra half is done (unom/infra runners/ci-core/): :5010 serves GET/HEAD only and
+# refuses everything else with 405, :5011 demands basic auth on every request. The half
+# in this file is done below: pushes and release-tag manifest PUTs authenticate.
+#
+# ⚠ On the second half as the review originally worded it — "pin consumers by @sha256:
+# digest". We deliberately do something else, because after authentication the digest
+# pin no longer buys what it was meant to buy. The set of people who can overwrite a tag
+# is now exactly the set who can push to main and edit a pinned digest in this very
+# file: a pin defends against nobody it did not already trust, while costing a
+# two-commit dance on every ci/ change (~3x a month) during which consumers silently run
+# a builder image that predates the ci/ change they are testing.
+#
+# What actually closes the residual gap — a tag quietly overwritten out of band — is
+# making :latest a CHECKED function of the tree instead of a tag someone remembered to
+# move. The "Reconcile :latest" step below asserts on every run that :latest and
+# :ck-$KEY are the same digest, repairs it when they are not, and says so loudly. That
+# catches an out-of-band overwrite on the next push to main, needs no churn, and fixes
+# a real pre-existing bug on the side: reverting ci/ used to leave :latest pointing at
+# the newer build forever. Revisit inline digest pins if the push credential ever leaves
+# the maintainer trust set.
 #
 # Bootstrap note: consuming workflows pull <LAN>/punktfunk-rust-ci:latest, so the LAN
 # registry must hold a seeded :latest once (done 2026-07-29 from the last Gitea-registry
@@ -60,7 +77,10 @@ on:
 env:
   REGISTRY: git.unom.io
   OWNER: unom
+  # Read port (anonymous, GET/HEAD only) and write port (basic auth). Two doors onto
+  # one store; see the header.
   CI_REGISTRY: 192.168.1.58:5010
+  CI_REGISTRY_PUSH: 192.168.1.58:5011
 
 jobs:
   builders:
@@ -116,21 +136,40 @@ jobs:
             echo "hit=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
           fi
 
+      # Tagged for the WRITE port: :5010 refuses a push outright, so a tag that names it
+      # can only fail. Consumers still pull the identical image from :5010.
       - name: Build
         if: steps.exists.outputs.hit == 'false'
         # --pull is cheap now: base images come through the ci-core pull-through mirror.
         run: |
           docker build --pull ${{ matrix.buildargs }} \
             -f "${{ matrix.dockerfile }}" \
-            -t "$CI_REGISTRY/${{ matrix.image }}:$KEY" \
-            -t "$CI_REGISTRY/${{ matrix.image }}:latest" \
+            -t "$CI_REGISTRY_PUSH/${{ matrix.image }}:$KEY" \
+            -t "$CI_REGISTRY_PUSH/${{ matrix.image }}:latest" \
             ci
 
+      - name: Log in to the LAN registry
+        run: |
+          echo "$CI_REGISTRY_PASSWORD" | docker login "$CI_REGISTRY_PUSH" -u ci --password-stdin
+        env:
+          CI_REGISTRY_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.CI_REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}
+
       - name: Push
         if: steps.exists.outputs.hit == 'false'
         run: |
-          docker push "$CI_REGISTRY/${{ matrix.image }}:$KEY"
-          docker push "$CI_REGISTRY/${{ matrix.image }}:latest"
+          docker push "$CI_REGISTRY_PUSH/${{ matrix.image }}:$KEY"
+          docker push "$CI_REGISTRY_PUSH/${{ matrix.image }}:latest"
+
+      # :latest must be whatever ci/ says it is, on every run — not only on the runs that
+      # happened to build. Two things break that: an out-of-band overwrite (the H-6
+      # attack, now only reachable by someone holding the push credential), and a plain
+      # revert of ci/, which leaves :latest on the newer build because the older key is
+      # already a cache hit and nothing re-points it. Both look identical from here and
+      # both are repaired the same way, so repair and shout rather than fail the build.
+      - name: Reconcile :latest with the content key
+        run: .gitea/scripts/reconcile-latest.sh "${{ matrix.image }}" "$KEY"
+        env:
+          CI_REGISTRY_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.CI_REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}
 
       # A release pins reproducible builder images without any rebuild: copy the key's
       # manifest to a vX.Y.Z tag via the registry API (no image bytes move).
@@ -142,8 +181,19 @@ jobs:
             | tr -d '\r' | sed -n 's/^[Cc]ontent-[Tt]ype: //p')
           curl -sf -H "$ACCEPT" -o /tmp/manifest.json \
             "http://$CI_REGISTRY/v2/${{ matrix.image }}/manifests/$KEY"
-          curl -sf -X PUT -H "Content-Type: $MT" --data-binary @/tmp/manifest.json \
-            "http://$CI_REGISTRY/v2/${{ matrix.image }}/manifests/$GITHUB_REF_NAME"
+          curl -sf -u "ci:$CI_REGISTRY_PASSWORD" -X PUT -H "Content-Type: $MT" \
+            --data-binary @/tmp/manifest.json \
+            "http://$CI_REGISTRY_PUSH/v2/${{ matrix.image }}/manifests/$GITHUB_REF_NAME"
+        env:
+          CI_REGISTRY_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.CI_REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}
+
+      # Today the job container is ephemeral (the ubuntu-24.04 label is a docker://
+      # image), so the credential docker login wrote would die with it anyway. Don't
+      # make that a load-bearing assumption about a runner label somebody may change to
+      # a host runner later.
+      - name: Log out of the LAN registry
+        if: always()
+        run: docker logout "$CI_REGISTRY_PUSH" || true
 
   # The aarch64 CROSS builder — a SEPARATE job because it is `FROM punktfunk-rust-ci:latest`
   # (the LAN copy) and so must not race the matrix entry that publishes that base. Consumed
@@ -182,15 +232,26 @@ jobs:
         run: |
           docker build --pull \
             -f ci/rust-ci-arm64cross.Dockerfile \
-            -t "$CI_REGISTRY/$IMAGE:$KEY" \
-            -t "$CI_REGISTRY/$IMAGE:latest" \
+            -t "$CI_REGISTRY_PUSH/$IMAGE:$KEY" \
+            -t "$CI_REGISTRY_PUSH/$IMAGE:latest" \
             .
 
+      - name: Log in to the LAN registry
+        run: |
+          echo "$CI_REGISTRY_PASSWORD" | docker login "$CI_REGISTRY_PUSH" -u ci --password-stdin
+        env:
+          CI_REGISTRY_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.CI_REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}
+
       - name: Push
         if: steps.exists.outputs.hit == 'false'
         run: |
-          docker push "$CI_REGISTRY/$IMAGE:$KEY"
-          docker push "$CI_REGISTRY/$IMAGE:latest"
+          docker push "$CI_REGISTRY_PUSH/$IMAGE:$KEY"
+          docker push "$CI_REGISTRY_PUSH/$IMAGE:latest"
+
+      - name: Reconcile :latest with the content key
+        run: .gitea/scripts/reconcile-latest.sh "$IMAGE" "$KEY"
+        env:
+          CI_REGISTRY_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.CI_REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}
 
       - name: Tag for release
         if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v')
@@ -200,8 +261,15 @@ jobs:
             | tr -d '\r' | sed -n 's/^[Cc]ontent-[Tt]ype: //p')
           curl -sf -H "$ACCEPT" -o /tmp/manifest.json \
             "http://$CI_REGISTRY/v2/$IMAGE/manifests/$KEY"
-          curl -sf -X PUT -H "Content-Type: $MT" --data-binary @/tmp/manifest.json \
-            "http://$CI_REGISTRY/v2/$IMAGE/manifests/$GITHUB_REF_NAME"
+          curl -sf -u "ci:$CI_REGISTRY_PASSWORD" -X PUT -H "Content-Type: $MT" \
+            --data-binary @/tmp/manifest.json \
+            "http://$CI_REGISTRY_PUSH/v2/$IMAGE/manifests/$GITHUB_REF_NAME"
+        env:
+          CI_REGISTRY_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.CI_REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}
+
+      - name: Log out of the LAN registry
+        if: always()
+        run: docker logout "$CI_REGISTRY_PUSH" || true
 
   # Deployable app images — unchanged flow, Gitea registry, per-SHA + release tags.
   apps: