Files
punktfunk/.cargo/audit.toml
enricobuehler 51a005dd43 fix(deps): close the audit gaps, drop unused declarations, declare what is used
Acting on the 2026-08-13 dependency sweep. Every claim below was re-verified against
the tree before acting on it (greps carry a positive control; the advisories were
re-checked with cargo audit 0.22.2).

SECURITY
- event-listener 5.4.1 -> 5.4.2 (RUSTSEC-2026-0221, unsound Send/Sync on StackSlot;
  reaches the tray via zbus and the host via ashpd). This sat unnoticed because
  `cargo audit` reports unsoundness as a WARNING and the job fails only on
  vulnerabilities — audit.toml now says so out loud.
- spin 0.9.8 -> 0.9.9. 0.9.8 is YANKED and was genuinely compiled (flume via mdns-sd
  and relm4, plus lazy_static).
- wayland-scanner 0.31.10 -> 0.31.11, which moves quick-xml 0.39 -> 0.41. That is the
  exact trigger audit.toml documented for RUSTSEC-2026-0194/0195, so both ignores are
  deleted rather than left as permanent exceptions. Only RUSTSEC-2023-0071 (rsa
  Marvin, still unfixed upstream) remains.
- Corrected audit.toml's claim that `paste` arrives "via utoipa-axum": rav1d pulls it
  too, so every client has it through the decode path and dropping utoipa-axum would
  not have cleared it.

TWO CI GATES THAT SCANNED NOTHING
- `cargo audit` only ever reads the ROOT Cargo.lock. The drivers lock was already in
  this job's `paths:` filter, so edits to it triggered a run that then ignored them.
  All four secondary workspaces now get an explicit `--file` (verified: clean, bar the
  known `paste` warning in drivers).
- packaging/windows/pf-vkhdr-layer had NO lockfile at all while shipping as a DLL in
  the host installer, so every build resolved fresh and neither cargo-audit nor
  cargo-about ever saw it. Lockfile generated and committed, and added to `paths:`.

UNUSED / DUPLICATE DECLARATIONS
- punktfunk-host: removed 13 dependencies it never references — the Wayland stack
  (client, protocols{,-wlr,-misc}, scanner, backend), xkbcommon, reis, khronos-egl,
  ash, usbip-sim, parking_lot, bytemuck. The code moved to pf-inject and pf-zerocopy
  in the subsystem extraction and those crates declare them; only the manifest entries
  and their now-false comments stayed. Also dropped four redundant re-declarations
  (tokio/serde_json/futures-util in the Linux block, tower in dev-deps).
- Removed genuinely unused: bytes (punktfunk-core), anyhow (pf-win-display),
  tracing (clients/cli), anyhow (clients/session), serde (clients/windows).
- Removed the high-level `wdk` crate from all five driver crates and the drivers
  workspace: none of them ever referenced `wdk::` (62 `wdk_sys::` uses; pf-umdf-util
  is a full WDF crate that never declared it). `tracing`/`tracing-subscriber` remain
  in that lock afterwards but ONLY as wdk-sys build-dependencies, not in the DLLs.
- pf-win-display took punktfunk-core with `quic` for one type (`Mode`) that lives in
  the ungated `config` module; now `default-features = false`, which keeps
  quinn/tokio/rcgen/opus out of a leaf crate's declared closure.
- pf-encode declared the windows-rs feature `Wdk_Graphics_Direct3D` for a call that
  lives in pf-frame and is resolved via GetProcAddress on gdi32.

LATENT BREAKAGE (compiled only by feature unification)
- pf-inject uses `tokio::select!` without declaring `macros` (borrowed from
  punktfunk-core's quic feature); pf-capture uses `tokio::sync::oneshot` without
  declaring `sync` (borrowed from ashpd->zbus); pf-client-core uses the `minwindef`
  and `winnt` windows-rs headers without declaring them (borrowed from
  clients/windows). Each now declares what it uses, so an unrelated crate changing its
  features cannot break them.
- pf-console-ui took pf-client-core WITHOUT `default-features = false`, unlike every
  other consumer. That default is `pyrowave`, which compiles the vendored PyroWave C++
  — "fatal on Windows ARM64". Only safe today because the ARM64 leg passes
  --no-default-features (which also drops `ui`).

CORRECTED A FALSE INVARIANT
- clients/windows claimed "the workspace builds ONE windows-rs". It does not: wasapi
  pulls the crates.io windows 0.62.2 beside the git-rev copy. The invariant that DOES
  hold is narrower (reactor and that crate share one rev, which is what makes the
  IDXGISwapChain1 hand-off type-check). Comment rewritten, with a warning against
  "fixing" it via a blanket [patch.crates-io] — this rev uses header-named features
  while a dozen other manifests use the old Win32_* namespace ones.

Plus the safe in-compat `cargo update` sweep (no manifest edits).

Verified on macOS: punktfunk-core 385, pf-update-check 32, c_abi 1 (with
LIBRARY_PATH=/opt/homebrew/opt/opus/lib), cargo audit clean bar the two known
unmaintained warnings. Linux and Windows legs follow.
2026-08-13 12:41:47 +02:00

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3.8 KiB
TOML

# cargo-audit configuration — consumed by `.gitea/workflows/audit.yml` (`cargo audit`).
#
# Silence only advisories that are KNOWN-UNFIXABLE and either not applicable to how we use the crate
# or an accepted, documented risk. Keep this list TIGHT and justify every entry — an ignore here
# means the audit job stops flagging it, so the reasoning must hold up.
#
# ⚠ NOTE: `cargo audit` (no `--deny warnings`) fails only on *vulnerabilities* — `unmaintained` AND
# `unsound` advisories are warnings that do NOT fail CI. That is deliberate for the two unmaintained
# crates below, but it does mean an unsoundness can sit here unnoticed: RUSTSEC-2026-0221
# (event-listener) did exactly that until the 2026-08-13 sweep. Read the job's warnings, not just
# its exit code.
#
# The two unmaintained ones, both transitive with no successor to bump to, left visible on purpose
# so we keep getting the maintenance signal:
# * audiopus_sys via opus (opus itself IS maintained; only its -sys layer is stuck).
# * paste via BOTH utoipa-axum (host) and rav1d (client decode path) — an earlier version of this
# note named only utoipa-axum, which would have made dropping utoipa-axum look like it cleared
# paste. It would not: every client pulls it through rav1d.
# (rustls-pemfile was dropped 2026-06-29 by removing axum-server's unused tls-rustls feature +
# moving our own PEM parsing to rustls-pki-types; memmap2's unsoundness was fixed by the 0.9.11
# bump.)
[advisories]
ignore = [
# rsa "Marvin Attack" (RUSTSEC-2023-0071): a timing side-channel in the rsa crate's variable-time
# modular exponentiation of the SECRET exponent. IMPORTANT — this affects the RSA private-key op in
# general, INCLUDING signing (m^d mod n), which the host DOES perform (gamestream/pairing.rs
# `signing_key.sign(&serversecret)`). It is NOT, as an earlier version of this note wrongly claimed,
# limited to decryption — so "the vulnerable path isn't exercised" is false; signing exercises it.
# We accept it because the attack is not practically reachable here, NOT because the path is unused:
# * No RSA decryption / PKCS#1v1.5 padding oracle exists anywhere (every `decrypt` in the tree is
# AES/AES-GCM), so the classic Bleichenbacher/Marvin chosen-ciphertext oracle is absent.
# * The only signed message (`serversecret`) is HOST-generated random, never attacker-chosen — so
# there's no adaptive chosen-input probing (the lever remote RSA-timing key recovery needs); and
# signing is gated behind the operator-entered pairing PIN, ONE signature per ceremony (a
# repeated phase-3 is rejected — gamestream/pairing.rs — to deny a passive timing-sample harvester).
# * GameStream is OFF by default (bare `serve` is native-only); the secure native QUIC plane uses
# rustls' constant-time backend, NOT the rsa crate. RSA is touched only on the opt-in,
# trusted-LAN GameStream/Moonlight pairing handshake. Moonlight mandates RSA-2048, so the
# GameStream identity cannot move to Ed25519/ECDSA (only the native identity could, and it
# already avoids the rsa crate).
# There is NO fixed rsa release (the constant-time rewrite is still unreleased upstream). Revisit if:
# a constant-time rsa ships (then drop this), the host ever signs an attacker-chosen message with
# this key, or any RSA decryption / key-transport using the private key is added.
"RUSTSEC-2023-0071",
# The quick-xml DoS pair (RUSTSEC-2026-0194/0195) used to be ignored here, with the note
# "revisit when wayland-scanner releases against quick-xml >=0.41". It has: wayland-scanner
# 0.31.11 moved to `quick-xml ^0.41` and the lock is on 0.41.0 as of 2026-08-13, so both
# entries were dropped rather than left as permanent exceptions.
]